Section 1122 program.1? The latter program has uniform basic provisions. Approval by state-designated planning agencies of hospital capital expenditures exceeding $100,000, of changes in bed size, and of changes in services offered is required as a precondition for full reimbursement for services financed under Social Security Act programs. In contrast, there is substantial interstate variation in CON in terms of comprehensiveness, dollar "thresholds" above which expenditures must be approved, and review and appeals procedures.TM Coverage generally extends to hospitals and nursing homes but not to doctors' offices, although this has been proposed. Many state laws provide for surveillance of health-service expansion, even when substantial capital expenditures are not involved. CON is a reactive form of regulation-the regulated institution, rather than the agency, takes the initiative in proposing a particular capital expenditure. Moreover, decertification of existing facilities and services is only in the discussion stage.12
In contrast to CON, which gives the state the power to absolutely forbid unapproved capital expenditures, the 1122 and Blue Cross programs use the third-party reimbursement mechanism as a regulatory tool. In principle, hospital expenditures attributable to unapproved capital projects are not reimbursed, and the hospital has to secure funds to cover these expenses from other sources, including other third-party payors. Unlike CON, the importance of these programs is proportional to the fraction of hospital revenues from Medicare and Medicaid (1122 programs) and Blue Cross (Blue Cross compliance programs). If these are unimportant revenue sources, the hospital may find it desirable to go ahead with a capital expenditure project without planning agency approval. Because all regulation of facilities and services involves planning agency deliberations, there is likely to be considerable overlap among the three programs in the process of granting approvals.
Most past research on facilities and services regulation focuses on certificate-of-need. n A three-tier application and review process is common (though not always in the sequence mentioned): review by an area-wide or regional planning agency with frequent provision for public hearings; approval by the state comprehensive planning board; and issuance of the certificate-of-need by the authority of the appropriate state department. CON The best-known multivariate studies of CON are by Salkever and Bice, and Hellinger.'7 Using state data for the 1968-1972 period, Salkever and Bice found that CON reduced bed expansion, but increased plant assets per bed, leading to the conclusion of no net impact on total investment (change in plant assets). The Hellinger study, based on data for 1972 and 1973, concluded that CON and 1122 have not significantly reduced hospital investment, but some suggestive evidence of a potentially negative impact was obtained. Both of these studies evaluated effects of legislation at a very early stage in implementation when such effects may not have been detectable. At issue, of course, is not only whether such legislation is able to slow growth in hospital facilities and services, but also whether it produces responses in less-regulated areas of hospital activity. None of the research conducted to date has addressed the latter question. 16 A dramatic example of the consequences of grandfathering occurred in Florida, where it has been estimated that 2,150 "grandfather" certificates were issued before the effective date of the statute. This is especially striking when one considers that in the year after CON In December 1972, regulations specific to institutional providers of health care were issued which limited growth in annual revenue due to (justifiable) price increases to 6 per cent. As ESP progressed, unanticipated administrative problems and political considerations led to exceptions, including exemption of low-wage employees from a 5.5 per cent limit on wage increases. The hospital variant of ESP was patterned after the general ESP program, emphasizing limits on price rather than expenditure increases as many health care experts would have preferred.
Revenue-Cost Regulation

Regulation of hospital revenues and costs attempts to directly impede inflation in this sector by placing limits on increases in charges and
The most comprehensive empirical evaluation of ESP's impact on hospitals is by Ginsburg. l9 Using regression analysis of aggregate data for the aine U.S. Census Divisions for 44 quarters (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) , he found that ESP had no significant effect on hospitals except for a slight negative impact on average wages. Ginsburg attributed the failure of ESP to have a major impact on costs to: disincentives to control costs (for example, the 6 per cent limit became a floor as well as a ceiling), ambiguous regulations, and expectations in the hospital community that ESP would be short-lived and hence not worth large-scale adjustments.
A generic definition of prospective reimbursement, as stated by Dowling is "... a method of paying hospitals in which (1) amounts or rates of payment are established in advance for the coming year, and (2) hospitals are paid these amounts or rates regardless of the costs they actually incur."20 In contradistinction to cost-based reimbursement in which (at least in principle) costs generate revenue, PR (again in principle) gives hospitals reasons to be concerned with the cost implications of changes in quantity, quality, style of care, scope of services, and efficiency because third-party payors under PR do not cover "overruns." Uniformity among PR programs statewide virtually ends with this definition. Important variations include (1) compulsory or voluntary hospital participation; (2) payors covered (for example, Medicaid, Blue Cross, commercial insurers); and (3) use of a formula or budget-review method for prospective rate setting. A priori, one can safely conclude that voluntary systems are unlikely to be effective as a general strategy for hospital cost containment, and we have excluded such programs from our empirical analysis.
Until recently, the only formula PR system was New York's and the New York experience, because of the number of years and hospitals covered, must dominate any current evaluation of formula PR, including ours. Under formula PR systems, the prospective rate is established by solving an equation of variables pertaining to individual hospital characteristics (for example, size, ownership, and teaching status), hospital performance (for example, occupancy rate, prior cost experience), and factors external to the hospital (for example, the general inflation rate). The formula is recomputed periodically, usually yearly, to arrive at a new prospective rate. This method involves relatively little direct interaction between hospitals and the ratesetting authority; therefore, it is less costly to administer and, although possibly more arbitrary, less likely to be redirected to the hospital's advantage.
Under budget-review PR systems, the hospital develops a budget for the prospective year which is reviewed by the PR authority. Items in the budget deemed unnecessary or excessive are eliminated or reduced. Hospitals are generally given the opportunity to negotiate or appeal budget-reducing decisions. Once the final budget has been approved, a payment rate is established that covers the hospital's budgeted costs. Because this method permits maximum recognition of individual hospital characteristics, it tends to be preferred by hospitals over the formula method. In fact, when given the choice between being regulated by budget review or a formula, all New Jersey hospitals chose the former.21 This is indirect evidence that the formula method tends to be tougher on hospitals than the budget method.
The extent to which patients in a hospital's market area have insurance covered by revenue-cost controls should bear a direct relationship to their influence on hospital behavior. This factor is incorporated in our analysis by defining our PR variables as proportions of patients in the market area with third-party coverage (for example, Medicaid, Blue Cross) governed by particular types of PR, either formula or budget-review.
A Input regression dependent variables are: RNs, LPNs, "other" employees, an index reflecting plant assets associated with specific facilities and services, current nonlabor-input expenditures and beds "set up and staffed." Our specification of labor-input variables reflects staffing data availability on the AHA general survey files. Data are given on full and part-time RNs, LPNs, interns and residents, employed physicians, and total employees, from which full-time equivalents (FTEs) have been calculated.29 The "other employee" category is total FTE employees minus the sum of the specified employee types. Interns and residents and employed MDs were not included in the analysis because they cannot be regarded simply as inputs to the production of hospital services. Employment of interns and residents and, often, salaried MDs involves production of educational services. Moreover, the compensation methods of many "hospital-based" physicians, particularly those in radiology and pathology, are the result of bilateral negotiations between physicians and hospitals rather than input-choice decisions on the part of hospitals alone. Thus, analysis of physician employment is best left to studies specifically tailored to account for these factors.
The asset index was obtained by regressing 1975 net plant assets per bed, adjusted for geographic variation in price levels, on a comprehensive list of binary variables representing hospital facilities and services (for example, cobalt therapy program, premature nursery, family planning service, home care department) and a few other standardizing variables which remain constant or nearly so from year to year (for example, region of the United States, city size). The estimated parameters from this "hedonic" asset regression indicate the amount of fixed capital associated with specific facilities and services. Since facilities and services vary over time and, of course, among hospitals, so does the index. When used as an explanatory variable in our average cost regressions, predicted assets per bed (ASSETB) represents the sophistication of the asset base, patient case-mix, and associated interest costs. 30
Our current (that is, noncapitalized) nonlabor-input variable measures yearly hospital expenditures per bed on supplies, food, minor equipment, insurance, contract purchases, and similar expenditures, but excludes depreciation and interest expense. Like all monetarily-expressed variables, it is measured in constant dollars as there is no good way to measure current nonlabor inputs in physical units.31
Typically, one thinks of changes in bed supply, our final input, in terms of long-run additions to hospital plant or, less frequently, retirement of existing capacity. However, hospitals also have the option of some short-run change in bed supply by decreasing the number of "set-up and staffed" beds or by adding beds to fill existing underutilized space. Because of high fixed costs and inflexibility of space, such options tend to be limited. Nevertheless, we observe some small changes in bed complements of individual hospitals; major changes tend to represent the fruits of building programs or, in isolated instances, retirement of large sections of the hospital plant.
Exogenous variables in all cost and input regressions include eleven regulation variables describing controls on hospital facility and service expansion, on revenues and costs, and on utilization of services.
Five binary variables represent certificate-of-need. The variable PRE-CON is one for hospitals located in a state in the year immediately preceding the introduction of CON. Thus PRECON can be one for, at most, one of the six years. This variable is designed to account for anticipatory behavior. An operating CON program is classified as either comprehensive or noncomprehensive. As defined, comprehensive programs include service-expansion 30 We recognize that facilities and services variables have not been validated as case-mix variables. Further, binary variables do not account for variations in scale. Ralph E. Berry, Product Heterogeneity and Hospital Cost Analysis, 12 Inquiry 67 (1970), used these variables in a manner similar to ours.
31 Hospitals face numerous trade-offs between current labor and nonlabor expenses, particularly with regard to choices of whether to provide laundry, housekeeping, dietary, and other labor-intensive services internally or to purchase such services externally on a contract basis or via sharing arrangements with other hospitals. review and have a threshold for review of equipment purchases of less than $100,000. These programs presumably leave less room for the kind of compensatory effects reported by Salkever and Bice, such as growth in assets per bed or labor inputs.32 We make a further distinction between "new"-the first or second year of operation-and "mature" programs-more than two years of operation. Several states changed from "new" to "mature" during 1970-1975. Thus, in a limited way, we are able to gauge changes in CON impact as the program matures. (It is possible that CON becomes more effective through a form of "learning-by-doing.") Prefixes "C" and "N" in front of CON designate comprehensive and noncomprehensive programs, respectively; suffixes 1 and 2 identify new and mature programs, respectively.
Most of our remaining regulatory variables operate in conjunction with third-party reimbursement. Hence, to construct the variables, a binary variable indicating that the regulatory program exists is multiplied by the proportion of the population in the hospital's area with the kind of insurance for which the regulation in question applies. The variable S1122 is the product of a binary variable indicating whether the program exists in the hospital's state and the sum of Medicare (MCARE) and Medicaid (MCAID) population proportions, since Section 1122 applies to these programs. The variable BCPAA is the product of a binary variable which equals one if the Blue Cross plan in the hospital's area requires local planning agency approval for major capital expenditures and Blue Cross's market share in the (Blue Cross plan catchment) area. As noted above, neither 1122 nor the Blue Cross program forbids the hospital from undertaking capital expansion or modernization; however, current expenditures associated with these capital purchases can be disallowed.
The ESP program, termed ESP in the analysis and defined as the fraction of the year that ESP was in effect, is the first revenue-cost regulation variable. Formula (FPR) and budget (BPR) prospective reimbursement programs are defined as the products of binary .variables identifying that the program was in effect and the proportions of the relevant populations covered. Since PR may apply to virtually any type of insurer and there is substantial interstate variation on this score, we have devoted considerable effort to computing the relevant population proportions.
The hospital costs and input employment.33 But even though relationships cannot often be signed, directions of intended impacts are clear from the vantage point of the policy maker. In this sense, it is not necessary to use economic theory to generate hypotheses about the effects of regulation. The null hypothesis can simply be that specific regulatory arrangements designed to contain costs and input expansion do not in fact achieve this objective.
Remaining independent variables in both cost and input regressions capture potential effects of variations in product-demand determinants, factor prices, and hospital characteristics that may influence the nature of the hospital product and types of patients treated. Apart from some computational innovations, these variables are, for the most part, very similar to those used in past studies of hospital costs. To conserve space, the nonregulation variables are not discussed; however, they are defined in Table 1 and parameter estimates are shown in Table 2 's cost regressions in the next section. The fact that many nonregulation variables have plausible effects on the dependent variables lends further support to our conclusions about regulatory impacts.34
Functional Form and Estimation
All regressions are estimated using a technique for pooling time series of cross sections developed by Nerlove.35 Details on the estimation procedure are given in the Appendix.
With the exception of the binary hospital characteristics and the regulation variables, which enter linearly, all cost function variables are in log form. This is also true of independent variables in the input regressions. With the exception of the bed regression, dependent variables in the inputs regressions are expressed as the ratio of the log of the input variable to the log of beds. By substituting the coefficients from the bed regression, all input regressions can be converted from ratios into levels. Estimating input regressions in ratio form greatly reduces multicollinearity and the necessary restriction on the input-beds elasticity is reasonably costless.36 One should expect the adjustment speed to be far more rapid with some inputs than with others. In fact, parameter estimates on explanatory variables representing input lag structure show this.37
Both cost and input equations contain lagged dependent variables. In the cost equations, we specify a Koyck lag structure by including lagged cost dependent variables. Speed of adjustment is given by one minus the parameter estimate on the lagged dependent variable (percentage of the difference in logarithms between the current and the equilibrium value made up in one year, two years, and so on). Our specification for inputs explicitly considers interdependencies among inputs in their lag structures. This flexible dynamic approach, developed by Nadiri and Rosen, allows, for example, demand for a specific type of labor to rise above its equilibrium value in the short run to accommodate output expansion due to the fixity of certain nonlabor inputs.38 The manner in which certificate-of-need variables were constructed makes growth percentages meaningless, so the latter were not reported in Table 1 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive
Cost Regressions
Empirical results pertaining to total hospital costs per adjusted patient day and per admission are presented in Table 2 . Although our interest centers on the parameter estimates from the regulation variables, other exogenous variables are shown so that readers may evaluate the entire set of regressions. The majority of coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels, using two-tail tests of significance. The coefficients' signs are mostly plausible in the sense that they agree with past research results40 or are readily interpreted.41 Moreover, the R2s, on the order of 0. As suggested above, the intended effects of various regulatory controls on hospital costs, from the standpoint of the policy maker, is unambiguously negative. In this regard, Table 2's regression results are not very encouraging in that over half of the parameter estimates for the regulatory program variables are positive. One might argue that positive parameter estimates may reflect a tendency for states with the most rapid inflation in hospital costs to be most likely to adopt regulatory controls; that is, the regulation variables may pick up omitted state effects. However, the combination of including lagged dependent variables and the estimation methodology of pooled time series of cross sections should have eliminated this problem.42 The regressions were run with the regulation variables stepped in last to permit testing the null hypothesis that the entire vector of regulatory variables makes no significant contribution to reducing unexplained variance in costs per adjusted patient day and per admission. The F-statistics for this test were far above the level to reject the null hypothesis at the one per cent level in both regressions. However, because both positive and negative regulation parameter estimates were obtained, one cannot infer from this test that regulation per se has had a consistent impact on hospital costs, holding other factors constant.
Five variables pertain to certificate-of-need. The PRECON coefficients in Table 2 's regressions imply a (statistically significant) positive anticipatory response of costs to CON. Remaining CON parameter estimates suggest that comprehensive programs (CCON1 and CCON2) have essentially no impact on hospital costs while noncomprehensive programs (NCON1 and NCON2), especially the more mature ones (NCON2), tend to have positive impacts. The short-run effect of a mature, noncomprehensive program is to raise total expense per adjusted patient day by nearly 5 per cent; the long-run effect is over twice this. To the extent that compensatory actions are taken in response to CON, it is not at all surprising that such responses are more pronounced in states with noncomprehensive programs.43
Results pertaining to the two remaining capital expansion control programs are mixed. Parameter estimates of S1122, the variable which measures proportions of populations covered by Medicare and Medicaid in years 42 ASSETB and bed-size dummy variables, which have been entered separately in the cost regressions, may themselves be affected by facilities and services regulation. However, because ASSETB demonstrates a negligible impact on costs and the bed-size categories are quite large, we are not concerned about potential indirect effects of the regulatory programs on costs. Given our parameter estimates pertaining to ASSETB and total beds as dependent variables (see Table 3 (3) limited and different methodologies used in each of these studies. Probably the best inference that can be drawn from past research is that PR may have had a small moderating influence on hospital costs, but the estimates of PR impact were often statistically insignificant and the methodologies frequently raised more questions than were answered.
At least on paper, the stronger form of prospective reimbursement is formula-based which, compared to budget-based systems, gives much less discretionary power to program administrators. Unfortunately, New York dominates the formula-PR picture. Hence, our evaluation of formula PR is largely a tale of regulation in one state. It is possible that our time series cross-section pooling methodology, which is designed to eliminate timeinvariant, unspecified hospital effects, may in instances such as this "throw out the baby with the bath water," namely, discard information on the effect of New York formula PR as well as other unspecified hospital or state effects. In any case, the FPR coefficients are positive in Table 2 As previously noted, we are only able to crudely measure the effects of Blue Cross and Medicaid efforts at utilization review (UR) and have no evidence on the PSRO program established under the 1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act. Also, since utilization measures are the denominators of our cost dependent variables, some possible effects of utilization review may be missed. Nevertheless, it is possible that utilization review has a negative impact on the provision of certain expensive and sometimes "unnecessary" services. Our UR measure should capture at least part of this influence. The regression estimates imply that UR has no impact on average cost per adjusted patient day, but the corresponding coefficient in the average cost per admission regression is negative and larger than its standard error. These results are plausible because if UR reduces length-ofstay, it should have a greater impact when an average cost measure with an admissions denominator is used. Data on utilization review are only available for 1974, and, therefore, the only reason for interyear variation in UR stems from changes in the proportions of patients with types of insurance covered by utilization review programs. Since these proportions change slowly over time, most of the variation in this variable is cross-sectional. The pooling methodology may be unduly "hard" on the UR parameter estimates, forcing them into insignificance. The UR parameter estimates in OLS variants of the average cost regressions (not shown) were both negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. If these estimates had been influenced by 46 See Ginsburg, supra notes 18 and 19. omitted state effects, the coefficients probably would have been positive, not negative. Table 3 presents structural parameter estimates of regulation variables (PRECON through UR) from the input regression set and associated shortrun (one-year) impact multipliers. The input dependent variables are RNs per bed, LPNs per bed, other employees per bed, predicted net plant assets per bed, current nonlabor expenses per bed, and total beds. Impact multipliers, pertaining to the first five dependent variables give the combined indirect effect (via regulation's impacts on beds) and direct effect (on ln(input) -In(beds)) of the regulatory programs. Thus, they show effects of the explanatory variables on input levels rather than ratios (to beds). Parameter estimates pertaining to nonregulation independent variables are not reported in Table 3 .
Input Regressions
Several findings unfavorable to certificate-of-need emerge from Table 3 . With regard to beds, we find a positive anticipatory response to CON. Judging from the PRECON parameter estimate in regression (6), there is a 1.4 per cent increase in bed growth during the year preceding the introduction of CON. The noncomprehensive programs, which presumably emphasize controls on bed supply, have no impact on beds whatsoever. By contrast, the comprehensive programs show a positive impact, especially during the first two years (CCON1). Possibly, the CCON1 coefficient, and even CCON2's, reflect some of the anticipatory effects captured by PRE-CON. In any event, there is no way to conclude from Table 3 that CON has reduced the growth in beds in our cohort of 1,228 hospitals. In fact, these programs, through anticipatory effects and other forces, seem to have actually stimulated bed growth in some states.
Although the coefficients of the CON variables on assets per bed in regression (4) are insignificant at conventional levels, they are indeed uniformly negative as are the impact multipliers, with two exceptions (for which the positive coefficients are very small). In terms of both assets per bed and assets per se, noncomprehensive programs show a slightly more negative effect than their comprehensive counterparts. We are unable to explain why. For both comprehensive and noncomprehensive programs, the "mature" programs (designated by the suffix "2") have somewhat more strongly negative effects on assets than their younger counterparts. These results differ from those of Salkever and Bice, who found CON raised assets per bed.47
Current nonlabor and labor expenses are not directly controlled by any CON program. Although there are some negative signs on CON variables in In sum, our results on CON are generally consistent with Salkever and Bice's, but we differ on particulars. Like Salkever and Bice, we find compensatory responses to CON; however, ours are on the labor rather than on the nonlabor side. Salkever and Bice did not assess CON impacts on labor use. Results on CON from our input analysis are broadly consistent with our results on costs; however, CON's compensatory effect on labor inputs is more evident from the input analysis.
Section 1122 programs had essentially zero impact in Table 2 's total cost regressions, but they had a significantly positive impact on labor expense per adjusted patient day (not shown). These results are confirmed in Table 3 (even though not all S1122 parameter estimates are statistically significant). Section 1122's impacts on nonlabor inputs in regressions (4) and (5) tend to be negative, but these negative impacts are offset by positive S1122 coefficients in the labor demand regressions (1) through (3). Basically the same arguments apply to 1122 as to CON. If third-party payors do not want to pay for nonlabor inputs, hospitals will find other ways to spend money. This finding, coupled with the CON results, suggests that projections of savings resulting from reducing "excess bed capacity" may seriously miss the mark because pressing in one place (for example, nonlabor inputs) may create a bulge elsewhere (for example, labor inputs).48 Table 3 's results pertaining to the Blue Cross planning agency approval variable (BCPAA) are not consistently negative as in Table 2 's average cost regressions. BCPAA has a significantly negative impact on bed expansion, but not on assets (or assets per bed). Also, these programs seem to have reduced hospital demand for RNs and LPNs but stimulated demand for other employees.
Of all regulation variables considered, ESP has the most definite negative impact on input use. Although ESP, not surprisingly, had no effect on beds due to its temporary nature, the ESP variable shows significantly negative impacts on assets per bed and current nonlabor expense per bed. Signs on the ESP coefficients in all three labor regressions are negative, albeit insignificant, in two of the three regressions. With the exception of beds, all impact multipliers relating ESP to levels of input use are negative. Multi-pliers are as high as -0.06, the multiplier on assets. These findings are consistent with Table 2 's average cost results.
Although states' experiences with prospective reimbursement have been studied at length,49 there is little evidence on PR effects on input use per se. Overall, the input regression results confirm the cost regressions in that formula PR (FPR) does not have a negative impact on most inputs. An exception is nursing, where a substitution of LPNs for RNs is evident. Abt Associates and Policy Analysis found a similar tendency in a study of prospective reimbursement effects on New York hospitals.5? We find no support whatsoever for the view that formula PR lowered the capital-labor ratio, a conclusion reached by Berry in his descriptive analysis of New York's formula PR system.51 Table 3 indicates that both assets per bed and beds rise, rather than fall, in response to FPR.
The budget PR (BPR) coefficients do not show stimulus to internal hospital growth implied by their FPR counterparts; nor is the implied reducedform positive impact on assets as great in regression (4). However, BPR's positive impact on labor in equations (1) and (3) appears even larger than FPR's. On the whole, the input analysis is less favorable than the cost analysis to budget PR.
Most of the utilization review (UR) parameter estimates are negative in the input regressions, although never statistically significant. The implied savings on inputs attributable to UR are substantial, almost too high to be believed. We are reluctant to place too much weight on the UR results because (1) both conceptually and institutionally, this type of program would be expected to be a comparatively weak form of regulation, (2) our UR variable is not well measured, and (3) the variable is not strong in our cost regressions. However, these results do suggest a need to investigate utilization review programs in greater depth.
As with the cost regressions, F-tests were performed to test the null hypothesis that the vector of regulation variables does not contribute significantly to reducing unexplained variance in the input regressions, with other independent variables entered first. Results of these tests were substantially different from the cost regressions. regressions. The low levels of significance reflect the fact that fewer regulation parameter estimates were statistically significant in the input regressions than the cost regressions. Of course, a regulatory program might affect only one type of input and still have a substantial impact on average costs.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Our evidence suggests that, as a group, regulatory programs did not meaningfully contain hospital costs during the first half of the 1970s. The results are consistent with three alternative views: (a) the regulations examined in this study do not have the capability of controlling hospital costs; (b) the regulations are effective, but our empirical approach was inappropriate to capture these effects; or (c) the regulations are potentially effective, but the time period studied was not long enough or was too soon after implementation in most cases for these effects to have become measurable. We feel that the first explanation is far more likely than the third and leave it to readers to judge the second.
There are a number of ways that one might accept these findings but still favor the regulatory approach to containing hospital costs. One plausible view is that the findings do not demonstrate regulatory failure per se but rather the inadequacy of a piecemeal approach to hospital cost containment. Regulation proponents might contend that many of the programs studied affect only a fraction of the hospital's patients or only limited dimensions of hospital behavior, and that such programs cannot be expected to achieve desired results unless they are sufficiently comprehensive to preclude compensatory responses of hospitals in unregulated areas of activity.
While this is not an unreasonable point of view, it would stretch credulity to attempt to make a case for more stringent and comprehensive regulation based on empirical evidence presented in this paper. Our findings are largely consistent with those from past multivariate research, and the methodology is sufficiently robust to detect manifestations of desired regulatory impacts if indeed they were present. With few exceptions, the bulk of this evidence has to be taken as generally unfavorable to regulatory solutions to hospital cost inflation. Moreover, there is some support in these findings (for example, positive parameter estimates of regulation variables in cost and input regressions) for believing that regulatory agencies are subject to capture and that hospitals can devise ways for circumventing most regulations. Health policy analysts who advocate organizational innovations and fostering competition in the hospital sector via, for example, promotion of health maintenance organizations, might see these findings as supportive of their position. If regulation is not the solution, increased competition, despite its limitations in this sector, is a logical alternative. Table 1 clearly shows the inflationary trend in real hospital costs and upward trend in input employment in recent years. Nonlabor costs have increased faster than labor costs. The hospital-industry literature of this period is full of accounts of how increases in expenses such as food, fuel, insurance, and so on have aggravated inflation and made it difficult for hospitals to adhere to regulatory guidelines regarding cost increases. One would expect nonlabor costs to have increased the most, and indeed current nonlabor expenses were by far the fastest growing of our input variables during this period. Still, the increase in labor inputs, measured on an FTE basis, was also substantial. Moreover, the growth of RNs relative to LPNs indicates some substitution toward higher quality and more expensive inputs. We suspect that there are many other examples of upgrading that American Hospital Association data do not permit us to measure. And it is difficult to embrace the view that inflation in factor prices is the culprit, in light of these increases in real inputs per bed.
The descriptive evidence in
One of the more salient specific findings pertaining to regulation is the indication of anticipatory effects of certificate-of-need programs in the beds regressions. We have virtually no information on the long-run "threat effects" of regulation of this sort, but major capital expansion programs clearly span several years from inception to completion. Therefore, some additions to hospital beds, generated by the prospect of future regulation, may not be manifested until long after implementation of a regulatory program. The solution to this problem is unclear; it is unlikely that "surprise" regulation is a politically viable concept and, in any case, development of CON programs in states which currently do not have them should not surprise anyone, especially since P.L. 93-641 requires states to do so.
Our empirical findings also indicate the presence of compensatory responses of hospitals to capital expansion regulation. Such effects were manifested in parameter estimates pertaining to CON and Section 1122 program variables in cost and labor input regressions. These results provide some support for the view that noncomprehensive regulatory programs tend to produce cost-increasing responses in unregulated areas. Additional indirect support for this view is provided by our results pertaining to ESP. The descriptive evidence and parameter estimates on ESP, the most comprehensive of the regulatory programs studied, do indicate a slowdown in total cost increases and input employment expansion during the ESP period.s2 This type of global approach to hospital cost containment may not represent an effective long-term solution to inflation in this sector, but we feel compelled to point out that this is one of the few indications of cost-reducing influences of regulation that we were able to obtain. Past research, on-the whole, has failed to show that prospective reimbursement contains hospital costs. Our findings also suggest that PR has, at best, a very small negative effect on costs and input use. All we can say is PR has not proven itself to be an effective inflation strategy, and current reliance on PR to hinder future hospital cost increases is empirically unjustified. Formula PR, at least on paper, seems promising, but, based on this study, it does not appear to be superior to budget-review PR.
Data limitations have forced us to measure some regulatory programs crudely (for example, utilization review), to combine program variants which might have productively been defined as separate explanatory variables (for example, prospective reimbursement programs using different units of payment), and to ignore a few programs altogether. Among the latter are PSROs. It may be unfair to infer much about the PSRO program from this study. However, "advance warnings" regarding the lack of costlimiting incentives inherent in PSRO have been stated more strongly than those that have accompanied the implementation of programs included in the present analysis.53 If there is any correspondence between advance warnings and program outcomes, one should not be very hopeful regarding cost effects of the PSRO program.
Our study assesses the impact of regulation on individual hospitals as opposed to hospital markets. By definition, our sample consisted of relatively "healthy" hospitals in that only hospitals existing in all sample years were selected. Regulation may have been tougher on the "unfit" who may have been forced to close or merge. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such activities have been relatively frequent in heavily regulated states such as New York and Massachusetts. If mergers and closures connote improved efficiency in the hospital market, clearly this potential benefit of regulation is deserving of closer attention in future research.
We may as well make the commonplace suggestion for further empirical analysis with more and better data on regulatory programs. There have been additional developments on the regulatory front after our period of study. A major part of future research on hospital regulation should be devoted to empirical analysis of area influence on hospital performance. Such research should examine the total market area effects of regulation on hospital utilization and expenditures. This is particularly true of capital investment regulation. Do such regulations cause inefficient hospitals to seek mergers or exit from the market? How do they affect entry and propensity toward development of shared services and similar arrangements? The payoff to research of this type may be greater than that from more microeconomic analysis of regulatory effects on individual hospitals. Finally, this research has left us with some feelings of uncertainty regarding the hospital decision-making process on response to regulations. Our theoretical work, not reported here, has shown that comparative statics analysis assuming a single hospital decision maker is not very useful in developing predictions of regulatory impact. On the policy front, the debate over hospital regulation has emphasized that there are competing interests within the hospital, particularly between the medical staff and administration. Future research that explicitly recognizes variations in medical staff characteristics and organizations may be fruitful in discovering reasons underlying variations in hospital performance in response to regulation. Put another way, is "control" (however defined) of medical staff a necessary condition for containment of hospital costs? We would like to know the answer to this question and suspect that many policy makers would share our interest.
APPENDIX ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
The econometric approach used in this study was developed by Nerlove for analysis of a time series of cross sections.54 According to Nerlove's formulation, the equation's disturbance term may be decomposed into two independent elements, a timeinvariant "state" effect (in our study, hospital effect) /xi and a state-and timeindependent effect vit. Then the structure of the equation's disturbance term may be expressed as 
